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ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS:
A PLAYING FIELD APPROACH
Paul J. Stancil*
INTRODUCTION
For the last thirty-five years, a substantial majority of Americans
has expressed biannually the cynical belief that government is "pretty
much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves" rather than
"for the benefit of all the people."' This belief may to some extent be
justified. "Earmarks," government subsidies, and "special interest
legislation" are regular features of the political landscape, as are the
lobbying operations whose sole raison d'dtre is to make interest group
dreams a reality. An entire subfield of economics, known variously as
"public choice theory" or "interest group theory" (IGT), has developed
to help explain how industries and interests can sometimes subvert the
political process.
But generalized electoral antipathy toward interest group politics
simply has not translated into meaningful legal obstacles to interest
group subversion of deliberative democracy; progress in applying
interest group theory to improve regulatory function has been stalled for
the better part of a generation. 2
According to the conventional wisdom, insuperable constitutional,
normative, and institutional hurdles await anyone foolhardy enough to
attempt IGT-driven reform. But careful analysis reveals that many of
these purported roadblocks share two common origins: (1) lack of a
consensus normative framework in which to apply the insights of
interest group theory; and (2) confusion and concern over how bestto
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. For helpful
comments on earlier stages of this project, thanks to Geoffrey Miller, Tom Ulen, David Hyman,
Lee Fennell, Neil Richards, Jim Rossi, Amitai Aviram, Scott Moss, David Mills, Todd Zywicki,
participants in law faculty workshops at the University of Virginia, Washington University in St.
Louis, Florida State University, the University of Cincinnati, and Marquette University, and
participants in the Fall 2006 Midwestern Law & Economics Association annual meeting.
I ANES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior, available at
http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab5a_2.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2007). ANES
ceased asking the relevant question in its 2006 study.
2 For one of the last major theoretical contributions to the debate, see Einer R. Elhauge, Does
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31 (1991).
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measure interest group dynamics in the real world. If these interrelated
problems can be solved, the primary objections to reform diminish
substantially.
These problems are difficult. Some would challenge prescriptive
application of interest group theory on the grounds that it is inherently
undemocratic or that it fails to acknowledge the largely virtuous and
public-regarding behavior of regulators. Similarly, interest group
theory is arguably normatively ambiguous, at least from an
instrumentalist perspective. For some, the old saw about lawyers
applies to interest groups with equal force: All interest groups are
horrible, except mine. 3 Thus, any project designed to curb interest
group influence must advance some coherent normative theory under
which intervention can be justified.
Measurement of interest group dynamics is also difficult. Many of
the most intuitively attractive measurement approaches are fatally
flawed, and the most obvious and familiar modes of analysis-ex post
evaluation of interest group behavior or ex post evaluation of
substantive regulatory results-are utterly unworkable for a variety of
reasons. Behavioral assessments are inherently subjective and can
easily be circumvented by infinitely creative political actors. It is also
extremely difficult to quantify the impact of various attempts to
influence government action.4 More subtly, substantive results affect
assessments of behavior. Whether a given interest group action is
viewed as "excessive" is inevitably driven at least in part by normative
preferences regarding the substantive outcome. In a world where
virtually any regulatory outcome is defensible under at least one
normative theory and may be indefensible under others, measurement
approaches based upon or influenced by the desirability of specific
results are not the answer.5
The measurement problem is also difficult because it implicitly
seems to require a coherent and complete theory of the interaction
between interest groups and regulators. This is hotly contested space, to
say the least. To some, it might seem important whether regulators can
generally be trusted to work in furtherance of the public good, whether
their votes are for sale to the highest bidder, or whether the truth is
somewhere in between. Given these challenges, is it possible to
measure interest group dynamics in a useful way?
This Article has two conceptual aims. First, it seeks to identify
3 This can be true even for economic libertarians whose overarching philosophy is likely to
be most closely aligned with general hostility toward interest groups. As Jill Fisch demonstrates
in her illustrative case study of Federal Express and its political activity, corporations are
sometimes extremely effective agents for deregulatory change. Jill E. Fisch, How Do
Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1518-28 (2005).
4 See, e.g., id.
5 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59.
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realistic, consensus normative goals for regulatory function. That is,
this Article attempts to define the circumstances under which interest
group theory is both (1) most reliably predictive and (2) least likely to
yield normatively desirable results. Having staked out this normative
territory, the Article then designs a metric around it. The metric this
Article proposes will assist in identifying regulatory scenarios in which
interest group subversion is objectively likely and unambiguously
undesirable.
This Article has three parts. Part I briefly summarizes and assesses
interest group theory and its implications for the demand for regulation.
In general, IGT predicts that small, focused interests often will be able
to overcome collective action hurdles and petition government for
benefits where large diffuse interests will not. To the extent we think
that regulatory processes reflect some combination of enlightened
public interest and democratic or majoritarian influence, IGT is
somewhat disquieting. Nonetheless, prescriptive approaches based
upon IGT are few and far between, in large part because of the absence
of a consensus normative framework and measurement approach
through which IGT's insights can be filtered and applied.
Part II proposes a normative baseline for measuring interest group
dynamics. As it turns out, the predictive value of IGT is often
independent of supply-side theories of regulation; whether regulators
are romantically republican or slyly self-serving, IGT still has predictive
force. Moreover normative aspirations to republican objectivity can
have disastrous side-effects. Thus, instead of untenable and potentially
counterproductive focus upon encouraging republican civic virtue, the
"second-best" norm this Article proposes-workably competitive
pluralism-seeks to ensure that the competing interests on either side of
an enacted or proposed regulation are relatively evenly balanced.
Though such a norm cannot guarantee republican deliberation, it can
promote effective regulatory deliberation by proxy.
Part III introduces and develops the Playing Field Index (PFI). An
ideal measurement of workably competitive pluralism would assess the
extent to which organizational dynamics predict a relatively fair fight
before regulators. As disparity between competing interests'
organizational opportunities increases, so too does the risk of regulatory
subversion. Thus, the PFI attempts to predict the likelihood of
regulatory petitioning on either side of a given regulatory nexus. The
concentration of benefits and costs accruing to interested parties is
critical to predicting whether interests will collectively or unilaterally
seek regulatory protection. This Article adapts the familiar Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) industrial concentration measure6 to the interest
6 In reality, this "adaptation" returns HHI closer to its econo-political historical roots. See
ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, NATIONAL POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF FOREIGN TRADE 157-62
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group context. Economists use HHI to predict the likelihood of
coordinated or unilateral anticompetitive behavior as a function of
industry concentration. Because the primary concern of IGT is the
relative rather than absolute dispersion of the benefits and costs of
regulation, this Article defines the PFI as the ratio between a "benefits
HI," measuring concentration of the benefits of regulation, and a
"costs HHI," measuring concentration of the costs of regulation. The
PFI can be measured using existing economic and econometric tools,
and is conceptually similar to calculations performed routinely by
courts, administrative agencies, and watchdog groups in a variety of
contexts. More important, the PFI is calculable primarily in contexts
where regulatory outcomes are normatively undesirable-naked rent-
seeking by special interests. The self-limiting PFI approach thus
undermines the foundations of our current remedial paralysis and offers
an important first step toward reform.
I. THE DEMAND FOR REGULATION
In 1886, Simon Newcomb observed that corporate interests could
"collect an extra profit of one cent per annum out of each inhabitant of
the country" and that "[n]ot one person out of a thousand would give a
moment's attention to the wrong, or indeed ever find it out." 7
Newcomb astutely noted that the average citizen "could not send a
letter, or print a handbill, or call a meeting of his neighbors without
spending more time than the question was worth."' 8 But not until the
middle of the 20th Century did interest group theory evolve from the
groundbreaking work of economists Anthony Downs, Mancur Olson,
George Stigler, James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, Gary Becker, Sam
Peltzman and others.9 This Article is primarily concerned with a
deceptively simple key insight of this early work, typically attributed to
(1945). Albert Hirschman's 1945 book, introducing what would later be renamed the Herfindahl
Hirschman Index, used a substantially identical measure to assess the relationship between
national power and foreign trade from the beginning of World War I through the end of the
1930s. Id.
7 See SIMON NEWCOMB, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 457 (1886).
8 See id.
9 See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957);
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1965); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3 (1971) [hereinafter Stigler, Economic Regulation];
JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of
Tariffs, Monopolies and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967); Gary S. Becker, A Theory of
Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976).
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Olson: small intensely interested groups can often overcome collective
action hurdles where large diffusely interested groups cannot.1 0 Within
the economics and legal academies, this and other related insights
ultimately evolved into the "public choice" school of regulatory theory.
A. Traditional Conceptions of Regulatory Demand
Demand-side interest group theory posits that groups face
substantial organizational obstacles to collective action. When the
benefits those groups seek are "public" or "collective;" that is, when all
similarly situated parties benefit from the provision of the good
regardless of whether they contributed to its acquisition, the collective
action problems increase substantially.
While basic economic theory predicts that all collective or public
goods will be "underdemanded""l due to collective action problems, 2
the extent to which public goods are undersought is a function of the
size of the group benefiting from the public good and the distribution of
benefits within that group. 3 For small groups seeking concentrated
(i.e., high per-capita) benefits, the collective action hurdles are lowest.
For large groups seeking diffuse (i.e., low per-capita) benefits,
collective action hurdles are highest.14
More formally, information costs, organization costs, and free rider
costs combine to advantage smaller, more intensely focused groups at
the expense of larger groups. "Information costs" refers primarily to the
costs voters face in informing themselves of the implications of a given
regulation. 15 In a world characterized by "package" or "bundled"
voting in which voters necessarily must concern themselves with
multiple issues, voters with small per-capita stakes will have little
incentive to incur the costs associated with obtaining information. 6
Similarly, the organization costs associated with full participation in
legislative demand may exceed the price low per-capita voters are
willing to pay.
Finally, free rider costs present a significant impediment to the
formation and effectiveness of large diffusely interested groups. For
actors whose per-capita benefits are low, there is a substantial incentive
10 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 9, at 22-33.
11 "Underdemanded" in this context refers only to the optimal level of demand predicted by
the self-interest of the demanders, not to any sort of normative optimal.
12 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 32-33.
13 See id. As discussed below, the demand for economic rents is usually decidedly
suboptimal from society's perspective.
14 See id.
15 See Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra note 9, at 11-12.
16 See Peltzman, supra note 9, at 213 (restating Stigler).
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to rely upon others to provide public goods. In a typical agricultural
subsidy scenario, for example, individual consumers may rationally
prefer to sit on the sidelines and let others carry their water. In the
aggregate, this free-riding risk substantially impedes effective
organization.
These same phenomena affect small intensely focused groups as
well.17 But given the greater concentration of benefits to small focused
groups, these information and organization costs are sometimes
surmountable. 18 There is often sufficient incentive for at least some
members of a small focused group to coordinate and seek collective
benefits, regardless of free rider problems. 19 The point is not that small
focused groups can easily overcome collective action hurdles, but rather
that they can do so relatively more easily than their large diffuse
opponents. In short, traditional demand-side interest group theory
asserts a sort of "law of diminishing returns to group size in politics." 20
Thus, demand for regulation is often driven by the relative collective
action hurdles facing various interested constituencies.2 1
B. Rent Extraction and Coasean Bargaining
More recent economic modeling of regulatory demand suggests a
slightly different understanding of the demand for regulation, but it does
not substantially affect the analysis of this Article. Fred McChesney in
particular has argued that the traditional Olson/Stigler/Becker free rider
model is incomplete, both because it fails to account for various other
economic incentives affecting demand-side actors and because it fails to
incorporate regulators as active, utility-maximizing participants in the
regulatory process. 22  McChesney notes that free riding is neither
necessary nor sufficient to explain the failure of some groups to
17 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 34-35.
18 And as discussed in Part III.A.3 below, small focused commercial groups may enjoy
additional benefits from organization as well. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
19 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 22-33.
20 See Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. L. & ECON. 211,
213(1976).
21 For discussion of how even larger groups can sometimes overcome collective action
challenges, see OLSON, supra note 9 at 132-33, 141-48; see also Geoffrey Miller, Public Choice
at the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83,
92-101 (1989).
22 See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory
of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987) [hereinafter McChesney, Rent Extraction]; Fred S.
McChesney, Rent Extraction and Interest-Group Organization in a Coasean Model of
Regulation, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 73 (1991) [hereinafter McChesney, Interest-Group Organization];
FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING: POLITICIANS, RENT EXTRACTION, AND POLITICAL
EXTORTION (1997) [hereinafter MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING].
[Vol. 29:31278
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organize. 23
In McChesney's view, part of the difference between observed
rates of organization to seek regulatory rents can be attributed solely to
the relative side benefits of that organization. 24 Producers are far more
likely to enjoy side benefits from organization than are consumers-
cost-reducing technical information exchanges, development of industry
standards, and demand-increasing collective advertising all may
encourage producer organization wholly exclusive of any rent-seeking
purpose, for example. 25 By contrast, consumers enjoy "few (if any)
comparable interdependencies"; thus, the expected benefits from
consumer organization are often wholly political. 26  This benefit
disparity has explanatory power "independent of any greater free-rider
problem afflicting consumers. ' '27 McChesney also notes that in the
traditional model, the benefits of organization rise along with the costs
of organization, 28 thus at least potentially weakening the explanatory
power of the free-riding explanation.
McChesney also highlights another weakness in the traditional
account: regulators in the traditional public choice model are treated as
passive recipients of rent-seeking payments, rather than active, self-
interested players in the regulatory rents game.29 McChesney notes that
regulators themselves face incentives to maximize their own utility by
demanding compensation for rent transfers. 30  Thus, McChesney
hypothesizes that a self-interested legislator will invest in credible
threats to undertake "surplus-transferring policies" to extract payments
from would-be victims. 31 According to McChesney, California state
legislators refer to such threats (usually issued in the form of draft
legislation) colloquially as "milker bills," a term used "to describe
legislative proposals" that are intended not to pass, but to elicit
contributions from those who would like to make sure they do not
pass. 32 Thus, in McChesney's model, the very existence of organization
23 See McChesney, Interest Group Organization at 74-85.
24 Here McChesney's model looks little different than Olson's. See OLSON, supra note 9 at
132-33, 141-48.
25 See McChesney, Interest Group Organization, supra note 22, at 77.
26 See id.
27 See id. at 77-78.
28 See id. at 78-79.
29 See, e.g., McChesney, Rent Extraction, supra note 22, passim.
30 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79; compare Becker,
supra note 9, passim.
31 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79-80. In a recent article,
Professors Edward McCaffery and Linda Cohen describe an apparent example of McChesney's
extortion dynamic in the context of federal estate tax regulation. See Edward J. McCaffery &
Linda R. Cohen, Shakedown at Gucci Gulch: The New Logic of Collective Action, 84 N.C. L.
REV. 1159 (2006).
32 See MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR NOTHING, supra note 22, at 29-30. Other legislatures
apparently refer to such threats as "cash cows," "juice bills," and "fetchers." See id.; see also
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is actually potentially costly to consumers, because it lowers politicians'
transaction costs in connection with delivering credible rent-extracting
threats to those consumers. 33
McChesney's Coasean theory of regulatory demand offers a
more complete picture of the forces affecting interest organization and
the concomitant demand for regulation. And recent research suggests
that it has some predictive power as well.34 But properly understood,
McChesney's insights are more supplement to the Olsonian
understanding than critique.35 McChesney's amplification of exogenous
demand-side interests, for example, merely expands upon the incentives
Olson identified. His analysis does not purport to dethrone collective
action hurdles as the most significant problem facing those with
political interests in organizing. If anything, McChesney's "additional
benefits to small groups" observation implies that large diffusely
interested groups may be even less likely to organize than a pure rent
concentration-driven analysis might suggest. McChesney's mode
renders the approach proposed in this Article slightly more conservative
because the analysis considers only endogenous costs and benefits.
Moreover, circumstances in which the McChesneyan dynamic would
cut against the measurement approach proposed in this Article are likely
to be few and far between. Finally, the side benefits of which
McChesney speaks are likely unquestionable. With respect to
McChesney's observation that the benefits of organization increase with
the costs, the Article's proposed concentration approach implicitly
subsumes this issue in its analysis. The normative model and
measurement approach should account for McChesney's theory, where
possible. But his demand-side insights do not substantially alter the
character of the inquiry. We will take up McChesney's supply-side
critique of traditional public choice theory in Part II of this Article.
Douglas Ginsburg, A New Economic Theory of Regulation Rent Extraction Rather Than Rent
Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771, 1774 (1999) (reviewing FRED S. MCCHESNEY, MONEY FOR
NOTHING, supra note 22).
33 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 84-85.
34 See generally McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 31.
35 McChesney's insights do, however, substantially undermine as overly simplistic the early
Stigler/Becker/Peltzman models built upon Olson's insights. See generally sources cited supra
note 9.
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II. A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INTEREST GROUP THEORY:
WORKABLY COMPETITIVE PLURALISM
A. Understanding the Present Prescriptive Paralysis
Despite its flaws, IGT has substantial predictive power. Why,
then, has IGT failed to provide the theoretical spearhead for a regulatory
revolution?
IGT has not gained much prescriptive traction for several reasons.
First and perhaps foremost, there is no consensus normative framework
through which to apply interest group theory to mitigate subversion of
the democratic process. The absence of this framework can be
attributed primarily to the fact that many find interest groups useful for
pursuing their policy preferences. 36
Given the human tendency toward ends-justified behavior, it is
perhaps unsurprising that few raise their voices in unequivocal,
universal opposition to interest groups. Instead, for many the implicit
denouncement is far more hypocritical: All interest groups are bad
except those promoting my desired goals. At least some of interest
groups' persistence is attributable to the collective realization that
interest groups and interest group dynamics are often useful
instrumental means to our preferred ends. Thus, large-scale attempts to
limit interest group influence are likely to run into a particularly
confounding problem: sometimes interest group theory works in our
favor.
This is not necessarily limited to the context of commercial self-
interest. One could argue that many of the consensus societal advances
of the last two generations were in fact a product of Olsonian interest
group dynamics, with relatively small, concentrated minorities
obtaining substantial economic and other benefits from larger, more
diffuse majorities facing insufficient individual incentives to organize or
complain.37 For those whose primary focus is upon regulatory results
rather than regulatory process, interest group subversion can sometimes
be justified. Thus, to gain broad-based support, any attempt to limit
interest group subversion of regulators should find some way to identify
and carve out interest group subversion that cannot easily be defended
on the basis of the substantive results it generates.
Almost as important, it is extremely difficult to identify and
measure interest group influence using traditional behavioral
36 Disputes regarding how and to what extent republican government should protect the rights
and interests of small groups are also potentially relevant to this discussion. The petitioning
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment, for example, arguably reflect a normative
commitment to giving minorities voice before regulators. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
37 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-54.
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approaches. There is no comprehensive list of objectionable rent-
seeking conduct to be proscribed, 38 and there is no meaningful way to
measure the effects various rent-seeking actions actually have upon
regulators.
Eliminating interest groups entirely is not in the cards.39 Thus, any
attempt to measure interest group dynamics for prescriptive purposes
must establish some "acceptable" level of activity, influence, or
incentives against which "excessive" interest group dynamics can be
identified by contrast. But as Einer Elhauge has persuasively argued,
most attempts to identify allegedly "excessive" interest group influence
necessarily depend upon our normative assessment of the regulatory
result.40 For many, the existence of a normatively acceptable outcome
will be prima facie evidence that interest group influence stayed within
acceptable levels; a normatively undesirable outcome will be proof that
interest groups sabotaged the regulatory process. Because there can be
no normative consensus regarding regulatory results, it is impossible to
design an objective system for assessing interest group influence based
upon quantification or characterization of specific interest group
activity.
Thus, any attempt to construct a consensus normative framework
for IGT must contend with two foundational issues. First, how do we
account for the supply side of the equation; that is, how does the
backstop of regulatory autonomy affect the predictive power of IGT?
Does it matter if regulators are truly public-spirited? What if they are
instead passive utility maximizers? What if they are more active in
their pursuit of personal gain?
Second, assuming IGT is broadly predictive, is that necessarily a
bad thing? Regardless of what Olsonian organizational dynamics may
suggest about the integrity of the regulatory process, they do not
inevitably suggest bad regulatory results. That is instead a function of
the specific small, concentrated interests that manage to bend
regulators' ears successfully. If organizational disparities provide a
useful means for the accomplishment of normatively desirably ends in
certain circumstances, is that necessarily fatal to prescriptive application
of IGT? Or is there some way to limit the use or abuse of
organizational disparities in pursuit of undesirable goals while
simultaneously tolerating their use as a tool for the accomplishment of
less objectionable ends?
38 Short of prohibiting all contact between regulators and the regulated, this might raise a few
minor constitutional questions.
39 Nor should it be. The constitutional concerns raised by significant attempts to limit interest
group activity are real, and interest groups also can serve valuable functions within the regulatory
state. See, e.g., KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND
DEMOCRACY 297-98 (1986).
40 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59.
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In short, is there a way to reconcile IGT with mainstream
normative preferences?
B. The Normative Irrelevance of Supply-Side Dynamics
Public choice theory's demand-side model of legislation is
relatively uncontroversial. How hard will peanut farmers fight to obtain
or retain government subsidies? How often will the general public take
to the streets regarding government-induced overcharges for peanut
butter?4' On the legislative demand side, at least, it is hard to deny that
public choice theory looks a lot like the real world. In that one respect,
life now is little different than it was when Simon Newcomb previewed
modern interest group theory in 1886.
But the supply side of the market for legislation is considerably
more complicated and controversial than the demand side. There are a
number of competing supply-side theories of regulatory motivation,
ranging from the hopelessly cynical to the naively optimistic. In
addition, there are myriad possible variations on each major theory, and
regulatory reality almost certainly consists of some continuously
shifting combination of the competing models. That said, I will briefly
sketch three major theories: traditional public choice, "extortionist"
public choice, and republicanism.
Some commentators argue that regulators predictably act in their
own self-interest, typically interpreted in terms of maximization of
reelection chances. 42  In these traditional public choice models,
regulators essentially take interest groups as they find them, attempting
to secure reelection by maximizing campaign contributions, maximizing
voting blocs, or by identifying and then pandering to median voters of
different types. In the traditional public choice context, the organization
of interest groups occurs independent of the regulator; she merely reacts
to interest group pressure in ways most likely to improve her personal
prospects. 43
41 According to one recent government publication, farming subsidies resulted in between
$300 million and $500 million in annual overcharges to peanut purchasers. See U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEANUT PROGRAM: IMPACT ON PEANUT PRODUCERS, USERS, AND THE
GOVERNMENT 4 (1995) (testimony of Robert A. Robinson, Associate Director, Food &
Agriculture Issues, Resources, Community & Economic Development Division, United States
General Accounting Office, before the Subcommittee on Risk Management and Specialty Crops,
Committee on Agriculture, House of Representatives) [hereinafter GAO, Peanut Program].
42 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 877 (1975); Stigler, Economic Regulation,
supra note 9, at 11; see also DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-24 (1991) (summarizing literature).
43 The ways in which regulators maximize differ substantially from theory to theory, and, to
the extent public choice theory is broadly descriptive, regulators probably maximize differently at
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The McChesney/McCaffery/Cohen "regulators-as-extortionists"
model offers another sophisticated but extreme example of the public
choice approach. 44 Specifically, this model argues that regulators face
incentives to maximize their own utility by demanding compensation
for rent transfers. 45 McChesney's regulators will threaten financially
harmful regulation to any group capable of paying "protection. '46 Thus,
in McChesney's model, the fact of being organized is actually
potentially costly to consumers, because it makes it possible for
regulators to deliver credible rent-extracting threats. 47 If regulators act
as McChesney, McCaffery and Cohen predict, then regulators will
prefer any situation in which competing interest groups can in fact be
goaded into competition with one another over situations in which only
one side or no side can be extorted.48
At the other edge of the continuum, some model the regulatory
process in more republican terms.49 To republican theorists, regulators
are public minded and altruistic, at least in the aggregate. Republican
theories of government hold that most regulatory processes are reliably
deliberative; at worst, more pluralistically minded republicans might
contend that the clash of competing demand-side interests typically will
proxy for the deliberation most would prefer to see.
Regardless of one's personal conception of the regulatory process,
it should be beyond dispute that interest groups are sometimes
successful in obtaining economic rents from legislators and regulators. 50
The real descriptive debate is not over if, but rather when, how, and
how much capture occurs; the real prescriptive debate is over whether,
when and how the law should react to such capture. Accordingly, this
different times and in different situations. The fact that a regulator may attempt to maximize
today, by increasing campaign contributions, and tomorrow, by assembling a majority voting
bloc, suggests that any attempt to limit interest group influence by limiting specific interest group
behaviors is doomed to failure. Even a complete ban on campaign contributions could not
prevent interest groups from attempting to deliver blocs of voters to a candidate, for example.
See, e.g., Brody Mullins, No Free Lunch: New Ethics Rules Vex Capitol Hill, WALL ST. J., Jan.
29, 2007, at Al (reporting on lobbyist workaround to avoid limitations of new ethics rules).
44 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22.
45 See id. at 79; compare Becker, supra note 9, passim.
46 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79-80; see also McCaffery
& Cohen, supra note 31.
47 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 84-85.
48 See, e.g., McCaffery & Cohen, supra note 31, at 1177-78.
49 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Mark Kelman, On
Democracy Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the Public
Choice Movement, 74 VA. L. REV. 199 (1988). For a slightly less rhetorically heated defense of
republicanism, see Abner J. Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV. 167 (1988) (symposium issue on
public choice theory); see also FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 42, at 42-47 (summarizing
literature).
50 One admittedly preliminary empirical study estimated the overall societal costs of rent-
seeking at 22.6% of U.S. gross national product in 1985. See David N. LaBand & John P.
Sophocleus, The Social Cost of Rent-Seeking: First Estimates, 58 PUB. CHOICE 269 (1988).
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Article need not and does not seek to answer definitively the question,
"How is regulatory sausage made?" As it turns out, the implications of
demand-side IGT are much the same regardless of how regulators
behave. The predictive capacity of IGT simply does not depend on
selecting the correct theory of regulatory motivation, nor should its
prescriptive implications depend upon one's personal political
preferences.
1. When Stigler Is Right: Traditional Public Choice Theory
If traditional public choice theory is correct, the story is
straightforward: regulators reliably act in their self-interest, albeit
primarily in response to interest group advances. Though public choice
traditionalists assume that regulators take the existence (or
nonexistence) of interest groups as a given, they posit fairly mercenary
behavior from that point forward. In the traditional public choice view,
regulators are primarily interested in reelection, or otherwise
maximizing their own political power. Thus, the paradigm public
choice regulator will attempt to maximize campaign contributions by
selling votes, or will make promises in order to secure the electoral
support of important voting constituencies or median voters.
In a traditional public choice world, therefore, rent-seekers'
success or failure will depend in large part upon the existence or
credible threat of opposition on the opposite side of the regulatory
nexus. As discussed below, most rent-providing regulation is in fact
socially inefficient. 5' Thus, absent organizational hurdles, those paying
for a rent-providing regulation will generally have a greater aggregate
incentive to oppose its passage than those seeking the rent. 52 As Neil
Komesar notes in the context of a hypothetical protectionist tariff, if
consumers are able "to represent their interests in the political process,.
• .the inefficient tariff would not be imposed." 53 More important, a
credible threat of consumer organization would in fact deter rent-
seeking in the first place. 54 Accordingly, regulatory results in a world in
which traditional IGT governs regulatory actors' behavior will depend
almost exclusively on the relative organizational dynamics story.
51 See Part II.C. 1; infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
52 See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW,
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 61-62 (1994).
53 Id. at 61.
54 Id. at 62 n. 18.
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2. Interest Group Theory in a Republican World
What if regulators instead reliably act in their perception of the
public interest? When organizational disparities are sufficiently great,
even the best-intentioned regulators are at risk. As Komesar explains,
the distortions and biases associated with "narrow self-interest" versions
of interest group theory also "occur in the presence of public-regarding,
public-interested, or ideological [legislative] motives. '55  Komesar
correctly characterizes the "motivation" focus of current regulatory
theory debates as "unfortunate." Most important, he observes,
excessive focus on individual regulators' motives tends to obscure the
importance of institutional dynamics in decisionmaking. 56 Traditional
economic theories of behavior are aggregative, funneling self-interest
through market mechanisms to yield publicly valuable results.
Summarizing the literature colloquially, Komesar cites the "well worn
maxim" that "private vice can be public virtue. ' 57 This dynamic applies
to economic theories of regulation just as it applies to price theory. 58
To demonstrate his point, Komesar hypothesizes a perfectly
altruistic legislature. Even with angelic regulators, demand-side public
choice theory is still both useful and disquieting, especially if we
acknowledge the obvious fact that legislatures often lack perfect
information regarding the effects of proposed regulation. Given this
unmet need, IGT predicts that small, focused groups will be
substantially more likely to organize and fill that information void than
will large diffuse groups. 59  Thus, if public-choice theory predicts
collective action on one side of a debate but not the other, even a public-
spirited regulatory body can be co-opted by way of its own ignorance. 60
55 Id. at 60.
56 Id.
57 Id. at61.
58 See id. at 61-65. Komesar notes, for example, that traditional Coasean bargaining assumes
perfect information, a condition unlikely to hold in the regulatory context. Given the existence of
informational asymmetries, playing field conditions become highly relevant. Ceteris paribus,
small intensely interested groups are likely to provide more information to legislators than large
diffusely interested groups. The interest-group-driven exacerbation of informational asymmetries
can in rum influence legislators regardless of their pureness of heart.
59 This is due to both free-rider problems and because those small focused groups often
organize for other internally beneficial purposes as well.
60 The greater the disparity in collective action problems between beneficiaries and payors
(i.e., the higher the PFI, see Part III.D.3; infra notes 151-154 and accompanying text), the more
pronounced this problem becomes. Because greater disparity in the likelihood of collective
action leads to greater disparity in the amount and quantity of information being provided to the
legislature, there is a real risk that the relative quiet from one quarter will be taken as evidence of
agreement or acquiescence. This is particularly true in connection with the economic rent
scenarios the PFI approach is best-suited to measure. The more financial the fight, the less non-
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As Komesar elegantly summarizes, "In effect, an interest group can
obtain a favorable result in three ways-propaganda, replacement (by
election), and inducement (bribes, contributions, and so forth). Only the
last is eliminated by assuming that public officials are public
interested. ' '61
Rent-seekers are rarely overt regarding their motives. Instead,
even regulation that excludes competition-probably the most common
and most obviously undesirable 62 form of rent-seeking-is "often cast
in terms of consumer health and safety. '63 Accordingly, as in the
traditional public choice model, the dynamics of organizational
challenges again drive the calculus; when members of the paying
majority "do not even have the incentive to recognize that they are
being harmed," regulators may find it particularly difficult to resist
interest group temptation. 64
3. Regulators as Extortionists
Finally, what if the McChesney/McCaffery/Cohen model of
activist regulatory rent extraction is correct?65 If regulators are actively
playing rent-seekers against their victims to extort surplus, wouldn't
that dramatically change the analysis of interest group dynamics? Not
really. Though this theory may paint a disturbing picture of regulators
generally, it does not dramatically alter the demand-side analysis of
interest group behavior.
Even if regulators behave the way McChesney predicts, there are
few implications of any sort where the disparity in organizational
dynamics is sufficiently acute. In such cases, the only real potential
difference from the traditional public choice model may be the
distribution of surplus or rents between rent-seekers and regulators-
activist regulators may demand a larger piece of the rent pie than they
would if they were merely responding to interest group attentions.
66
When organizational disparity is high, regulators will not be able to
economic utility functions are likely to engender opposition to rent-seeking behavior.
61 KOMESAR, supra note 52, at 63-64. Also, one should not underestimate the power of self-
deluding rationalization in the regulatory environment, where compromise is an absolute
prerequisite to accomplishment.
62 See Part II.C. 1; infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
63 KOMESAR, supra note 52, at 68-69.
64 As discussed below, aspiration to a republican norm is untenable in any event. See Part
II.C.2.a.; infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. Thus, even if regulators consistently do their
best, the only viable way to improve the regulatory process as a whole is to limit the number of
one-sided conversations.
65 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79-85; see also McCaffery
& Cohen, supra note 31.
66 Even this difference may be overstated.
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create competing interest groups-they can play only a one-sided game.
Thus, the potential for regulatory subversion is roughly the same as in
the traditional model.
What if organizational dynamics suggest that competing interest
groups can or will form? In such cases, McChesney's model disturbs,
because it suggests that one interest can be played off against another ad
infinitum. At first blush, the McChesney model could be read to
suggest that the existence of competing interest groups would actually
be the worst of all possible worlds, because regulators could continually
extract surplus from both sides. But this reading ignores the nature of
the regulatory game. The credibility of regulatory threats is critically
important to the success of any extortionist strategy. Thus, to the extent
organizational dynamics suggest a relatively even regulatory playing
field, the expected value of any particular rent-seeking strategy
decreases. 67  And the lower the expected value of a rent-seeking
strategy, the less likely it will be employed. For this reason, the
McChesney approach does not dramatically alter the broader demand-
side analysis-the tilt of the regulatory playing field still matters
substantially, albeit for slightly different reasons.
The insights of IGT apply to each of the three major theories of
regulatory motivation discussed above and, by extension, to the myriad
permutations and combinations observed in the real world. In each
case, IGT implies procedural subversion when there is substantial
disparity in the organizational hurdles facing interests on opposite sides
of the regulatory nexus. These flaws are magnified when the interests
in question are largely pecuniary; without an ideological rallying point,
large diffuse interests are even less likely to organize, and regulators
will be forced to operate without the ideological touchstones that can in
other circumstances help mitigate interest group activity. In any event,
theories of legislative motivation are largely irrelevant to the question of
how we should think about IGT from a normative perspective. Ceteris
paribus, the appropriate normative preference is therefore for less rather
than more disparity in organizational dynamics.
C. Extracting a Normative Consensus from Ambiguity
Even if one adopts a ceteris paribus preference for relative equality
in organizational dynamics, interest group theory is normatively
ambiguous from an abstract instrumentalist perspective. The same
67 In colloquial terms, expected value is simply the pecuniary value of a given outcome
multiplied by its probability. As the probability decreases (here due to the existence of a credible
threat of competing regulatory petitioning), so does the expected value. As expected value of an
economic rent decreases, so does the amount parties are willing to spend to obtain that rent.
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forces that allow "bad" interest groups to obtain "bad" regulatory
outcomes can also work the other way, allowing "good" groups to
obtain "good" results. 68 It all depends on one's point of view. The
Constitution itself increases the uncertainty, incorporating both
structural features and enumerated rights designed to protect and even
amplify minority voices. But this ambiguity conflicts with a deep,
abiding and important consensus within American society that interest
group subversion is wrong, that we know it when we see it, and that
something should be done to fix it. Can the circle be squared?
The normative framework this Article proposes for evaluating
interest group dynamics develops in two parts. First, it argues that a
cross-ideological consensus can and should exist as to a specific type of
interest group-influenced regulation to be condemned: pecuniary rent-
seeking. 69 Second, recognizing that aspiration toward a pure republican
process is unwise, the Article instead argues for a process-driven norm
in which the goal is to have a relatively fair fight before regulators. As
between the two components, the preference against "pecuniary rent-
seeking" is subordinate to the preference for a level regulatory playing
field. The Article labels the resulting norm "workably competitive
pluralism."
1. The Social Costs of Pecuniary Rent-Seeking
Interest group activity comes in many flavors. Though disparities
in organizational environments can ultimately yield regulatory results
different from the results that would have obtained in an interest group-
free context, different is not always obviously worse, especially where
majoritarian passions may be suspect.70 Thus, it is not necessarily
desirable to condemn all interest-group behavior or to condemn all
68 See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 2, at 50 ("Rather, under any plausible measure of social
desirability, it will in some instances be desirable for the intensely interested minority to win.").
That the intensely interested minority's interests may be consonant with the greater good does not
ipso facto mean that subversion of the deliberative process is a legitimate means to that legitimate
end.
69 Adoption of this normative goal does not mean that regulation of interest group activity in
pursuit of that goal is better attempted at the results nexus. But see Elhauge, supra note 2, at 5 1-
52, 62. Elhauge's argument that "once one has such a normative baseline, interest group theory
provides no additional normative insight" is incorrect if, as here, the normative baseline in
question seeks a level procedural playing field. Id. at 51-52. The subsidiary normative goal of
preventing pecuniary economic rent-seeking does not necessarily mean that all regulatory results
properly identifiable as such must be condemned. Rather, given the competing concerns
attendant with any analysis of the regulatory process, this Article instead adopts a normative
framework in which regulators would be allowed to regulate in normatively undesirable ways,
provided there is reason to believe that all sides will be heard in the regulatory process. The norm
against "pecuniary rent-seeking" simply informs the method of measurement and analysis.
70 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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regulatory action resulting from Olsonian disparities in organizational
dynamics. 7' When interest groups take advantage of lower relative
costs of organization to promote racial equality, or to protect the
environment, these desirable ends arguably justify procedurally
subversive means.
But one type of rent-seeking is particularly difficult to defend:
pecuniary rent-seeking. Economic rent-seeking of this sort typically is
embodied in commercial actors' attempts to insulate themselves from
market forces, either by limiting entry (tariffs, licensing regimes,
production quotas), or by directly fixing prices. This sort of rent-
seeking incurs substantial and indisputable social costs, many of which
fall directly or indirectly upon individual consumers. Equally
important, these costs are not typically offset by countervailing social
gains, financial or otherwise.
The social costs of economic rent-seeking have been well-
documented elsewhere, thus this Article will not recapitulate the
analysis in detail. However, I will summarize briefly the three primary
categories of social loss associated with rent-seeking behavior.
a. Tullock Losses
One category of social losses associated with rent-seeking behavior
comprises expenditures made in the pursuit and administration of rents.
By definition, parties seeking economic rents will be willing to spend
just up to the value of that rent to obtain the benefit. In the regulatory
context, these payments take the form of lobbying expenditures,
campaign contributions, and the other commitments of time and money
interests make in pursuit of their rent-seeking goals. Though such
expenditures might make lobbyists, restaurants and resorts happy, they
are socially wasteful, as Gordon Tullock demonstrated in a seminal
article. 72 Tullock also identified another similar form of social costs:
the administrative costs associated with running a rent-providing
program. 73  Like expenditures made in pursuit of rents, these
administrative costs have no redeeming social utility.
b. Harberger Losses
Successful rent-seeking programs often engender further social
costs in the form of "deadweight" or "Harberger" losses associated
71 Nor is it necessarily constitutional. See generally Elhauge, supra note 2.
72 See Tullock, supra note 9, at 228; see also Becker, supra note 9, at 387.
73 See Tullock, supra note 9, at 225-26.
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with the artificial shift of the supply curve that rent-providing programs
usually cause. 74 The deadweight social costs of interest group success
arise primarily out of the reduction in output associated with that
success. Much rent-seeking activity demands regulation that limits
entry into specific markets or cartelizes production of a good or
service. 75 These restrictions either directly or indirectly allow rent-
seeking interests to select output levels below those that would obtain in
a competitive market. 76
Deadweight loss can also be characterized as an allocative
efficiency problem. In a traditional economic rent scenario, producers
allocate fewer resources to production than they would in a competitive
market, thus leaving some number of potential consumers unserved
despite a willingness to pay at or above the competitive equilibrium
price for the good or service. In virtually every circumstance and under
virtually every serious normative theory of economics, allocative
efficiency losses of this sort are undesirable.
c. Transfer/Overcharge Costs of Successful Rent-Seeking
Another category of social losses resulting from successful rent-
seeking consists of the overcharges paid by consumers for the good or
service whose supply has been artificially reduced by government
regulation. 77 While this category of social loss is more obvious and
intuitive than the deadweight losses discussed above, its redistributive
character also makes it somewhat more controversial. It may be less
clearly objectionable to transfer wealth from one interest to another-by
whatever mechanism-than to create allocative efficiency losses. Thus,
some might argue that overcharges paid by consumers are not clearly
undesirable to the extent they end up not lost but merely transferred to
the successful regulatory petitioner. 78
74 See, e.g., Arnold C. Harberger, The Measurement of Waste, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 58 (1964);
Arnold C. Harberger, Monopoly and Resource Allocation, 44 AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1954).
75 See Stigler, Economic Regulation, supra note 9, at 5-6. Olsonian interest group theory
extends beyond the traditional pecuniary rent-seeking context as well, though it is of course
possible to characterize any such activity in rent-seeking terms. Whenever a concentrated
minority seeks benefits at the expense of a diffuse majority, those benefits can be defined as
"rents" to the extent they would not have been provided absent Olsonian organizational
dynamics. Nonetheless, because the normative implications of interest group activity grow ever
murkier the further one moves from traditional financial rent-seeking, the antitrust-focused
approach this Article introduces is superior to approaches that would attempt to limit interest
group activity more broadly.
76 See OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms, Dead-Weight Welfare Loss,
http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=3 187 (last visited Dec. 5, 2006).
77 See, eg., Richard A. Ippolito & Robert T. Masson, The Social Cost of Government
Regulation of Milk, 21 J.L. & ECON. 33 (1978).
78 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 53-54 (summarizing the argument without expressly adopting
2008] 1291
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
Yet ultimately, the redistributive losses associated with most
economic rents are objectionable under any credible theory of
regulation or total social welfare. Even when there is a facially credible
public interest justification for rent-providing regulation (e.g., public
health or safety), the economic rents themselves are usually a side-effect
rather than a goal of the regulatory scheme.
This is typically true even if one adopts a relatively liberal attitude
toward redistribution generally. If we seek to maximize total economic
welfare, it is difficult to posit a redistributive equilibrium superior to a
rent-free competitive equilibrium. This is especially true where there is
significant organizational disparity because the marginal utility of each
additional dollar to rent-seekers will almost always be lower than the
marginal value of that same dollar to payors. Is an extra dollar for a
large dairy farm more or less valuable than that same dollar in the hands
of a single parent purchasing milk for her children? While the total
utility of the dairy farm may increase by more than the total utility of
any one consumer decreases, it is extremely unlikely that aggregate
utility will increase by virtue of a rent-driven redistribution.
2. Toward Workably Competitive Pluralism
If IGT is descriptively accurate regardless of regulatory
motivation, and if pecuniary rent-seeking is normatively undesirable,
one question yet remains: what sort of regulatory environment should
our normative framework promote? Given the realities of the
regulatory process, this boils down to a choice between two options:
promoting republicanism or promoting a relatively level playing field
among interests competing for regulatory influence. Because aspiration
to a republican norm is politically and normatively untenable, the level
playing field option is a preferred second-best. 79  This "workably
competitive pluralism" should be the goal regardless of our
understanding of the legislative process-it should be equally attractive
to cynical public choice theorists and starry-eyed republicans alike.
a. Odysseus and the Sirens' Song: The Argument Against Republican
Aspirations
Direct analogy between interest group activity and the sirens' song
of Greek myth may or may not be completely fair; nonetheless, one
it).
79 See R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON.
STD. 11 (1956).
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possible response to the interest group problem is that of Odysseus.
When passing by the sirens' island, Odysseus had his men block their
ears with beeswax.80 Aspirations to republicanism would necessarily
take this form, and the only way to promote republicanism beyond the
current incentive structure would be to limit the extent to which
regulators can hear or respond to interest groups' petitions.
This would be a bad idea. Given the infinite ingenuity of the
human mind, the Odyssean approach would necessarily be all or
nothing-limits on specific categories of conduct (e.g., campaign
contributions) are singularly ineffective. There's no such thing as
selective beeswax. Rather, the republican norm can be promoted
effectively only by a wholesale ban on interest group activity or its
functional equivalent. In addition to the substantial First Amendment
problems attending such a "solution," this approach would unjustifiably
impugn the integrity of regulators and would prevent interest groups
from serving their two potentially valuable functions: protection of
minority rights in non-pecuniary contexts and provision of information
to rationally ignorant regulators.
The republican norm is attractive. From junior high civics classes
forward, we learn that the republican process is sacrosanct. It is but a
small leap to conclude that its sanctity should also be our end. And
measured against the refined elegance and purity of Athenian
deliberation, the pluralist alternative seems gauche and primal by
comparison. Nonetheless, aspirations to pure republicanism are
politically and normatively untenable because untainted republican
deliberation can only be accomplished through the destruction of other
core republican and democratic values. Thus we must look for a
second-best. 81
b. Another Way Past the Island: Workably Competitive Pluralism
Odyssean beeswax was not the only solution to the problem posed
by the sirens' song. Jason and his Argonauts faced the same seduction
but prevailed in a different way: competition. Where Odysseus's men
80 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 107-08 (Samuel Butler trans., Barnes & Noble Books 1993) (800
B.C.E.).
81 See, eg., Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note 79. Somewhat ironically, wholesale attempts to
curtail interest group activity become less attractive the more republican the actual regulatory
baseline. If regulators can generally be relied upon to act in the public interest, then further
restricting interest group activity as a whole is likely to fare quite badly on the constitutional
cost/benefit scale. Such restrictions would significantly impair the constitutional rights of all
interests and interest groups, with little or no improvement to the regulatory process. By contrast,
workably competitive pluralism hones in on contexts in which even purity of regulatory heart
may be insufficient to ensure purity of regulatory result.
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plugged their ears, Jason's men instead listened to the competing tune
of Orpheus's harp.8 2 If we cannot seek a system in which regulators'
ears are plugged, we can do the next best thing by seeking to ensure that
they are hearing more than one song.
To this end, IGT should be applied in pursuit of a "workably
competitive pluralism" norm. What is meant by "workably competitive
pluralism?" Though the specific contours of the norm should be left
undefined in the absence of hard experiential data, the concept is simple
enough: the universally applicable insights of IGT suggest a normative
preference for environments in which the pecuniary interests on either
side of a regulatory nexus are somewhat evenly matched. Relative
parity of interests in turn implies a relatively equal likelihood of
organization and petitioning, thus promoting either legitimate regulatory
deliberation or a close facsimile thereof.
Interests need not be precisely matched to be workably
competitive. Rather, the norm would necessarily promote a balance
designed to ensure some appropriate level of deliberation by proxy
without impinging excessively upon constitutional and other interests.
Importantly, workably competitive pluralism works regardless of the
operative theory of regulatory motivation.
Whether regulators are republicans or extortionists, workably
competitive pluralism will improve regulatory function. Assume, for
example, a regulatory nexus in which the players are relatively evenly
matched. If the regulators sitting atop that nexus are reliably
republican, this playing field parity suggests that there will be little or
no informational asymmetry; regulators will act in response to a "fully
litigated" adversarial process. If regulators instead respond to interest
groups as traditional public choice theory suggests, playing field parity
is still preferable. As Professor Komesar notes in the context of a
hypothetical protectionist tariff benefiting a single industry at the
expense of all consumers, if consumers are able "to represent their
interests in the political process, . . . the inefficient tariff would not be
imposed. 8 3 Consumers' interests in opposing the rent-seeking typically
exceed rent-seekers' interests in obtaining the rent. More important, the
credible threat of consumer organization deters rent-seeking in the first
place.84 Accordingly, a world in which traditional IGT governs
regulatory actors' behavior should seek relative organizational parity
among competing interests as a bulwark against interest-group
subversion.
The story is the same if regulators are the extortionists McChesney
82 APOLL1NIUS RHODIUS, THE ARGONAUTICA 11. 885-921, at 86 (R. C. Seaton, trans.,
MacMillan 1912) (3rd Century B.C.E.).
83 KOMESAR, supra note 52, at 61.
84 See id. at 62 n. 18.
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models. In such cases, significant organizational disparities continue to
prefigure a regulatory market failure. With only one side to pick on,
regulators will ultimately provide the requested rent;8 5 McChesney's
model merely suggests that regulators may extract quite a lot of the
value of that rent through regulatory extortion, and that even "one-
player" scenarios do not necessarily yield rent-providing regulation "on
the cheap."
But what happens if regulatory extortionists face a relatively level
playing field?
If organizational dynamics are similar on both sides of the
regulatory nexus, McChesney suggests that regulators will play one side
off the other, extracting surplus from both and potentially doing very
little actual regulating. This doesn't speak well of regulators, but it
doesn't make organizational parity any less desirable.
Workably competitive pluralism may not guarantee a deliberative
result before McChesney's regulators. But organizational parity will
substantially affect various interests' ex ante assessments of the value of
petitioning activity. With two equally matched interests, the expected
value of rent-seeking decreases substantially. This will in turn deter
rent-seeking, and it will limit the credibility of regulators' threats of
regulation. Thus, workably competitive pluralism is also a desirable
norm if regulators are best characterized as extortionists. 86
III. THE PLAYING FIELD INDEX
A "workably competitive pluralism" norm implies a measurement.
If we are concerned not specifically about regulatory results, but instead
about the potential procedural subversion of the democratic process that
produces those results, then we must develop some way of identifying
when regulatory markets are workably competitive and when they are
not. And if we limit our concern to situations involving pecuniary rent-
seeking, an ideal measurement would be self-limiting, assessing only
contexts in which that specific form of activity is involved.
85 In cases of substantial organizational disparity, true "milker bill" extortion would
ultimately be self-defeating for regulators; they would have to provide the rent in order to
encourage rent-seekers to spend.
86 This Article takes no formal position on the correct theory or theories of regulatory
motivation, in part because regulatory reality is quite complicated. There is undoubtedly a grain
of truth in each competing theory, and many regulatory decisions are probably influenced by
some combination of the various incentives commentators have identified. See generally FARBER
& FRICKEY, supra note 42.
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A. What Then Should We Measure?
The twin goals of any prescriptive application of IGT must be to
promote workably competitive pluralism and to limit the extent to
which regulatory processes yield pecuniary economic rents to market
participants. With these normative goals in mind, how should interest
group dynamics or activity be measured? There are several possible
approaches to this problem, but only one-measurement and
comparison of the costs and benefits of successful regulatory petitioning
-is technically feasible and normatively appropriate.
1. Results Focus: Can the Ends Define the Means?
One possible measurement approach would focus on the results of
regulatory petitioning. In other words, one could analyze the economic
effects of various regulatory regimes, identifying interest group
influence as "excessive" whenever the regulatory process yields
pecuniary economic rents. Though results-oriented approaches have
been proposed before,87 they are ultimately unworkable for a variety of
reasons.
First and foremost, a results-focused measurement would
essentially collapse the two-pronged inquiry suggested by the normative
framework into a single inquiry: do we dislike the outcome? Though
opposition to pecuniary economic rent-seeking is substantial, it is far
from universal. 88 One can hypothesize several scenarios in which a
regulatory body may affirmatively desire, after due deliberation, to
provide an economic rent to a specific group. 89 Under many theories of
regulation, the granting of that rent is not a priori undesirable. 90 This is
especially true when the regulation is produced via a workably
competitive process. There is far less normative ambiguity when the
process itself is inherently suspect.
Results-based measurements are also necessarily binary and thus
allow for no calibrated measurement of the regulatory process. In a
results-driven framework, regulation either does or does not provide an
economic rent. The existence or nonexistence of the rent, proven by
87 See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV.
713 (1986); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 29 (1985); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
88 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59.
89 The most obvious examples involve attempts to compensate historically disadvantaged
groups for the effects of prior discrimination.
90 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59.
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preponderance of the evidence, would in turn drive any prescriptive
application based upon the measurement approach.
It would be difficult to compromise based upon other competing
interests in a results-oriented framework, and yet that compromise may
be necessary. For example, the American system values both regulatory
autonomy and petitioning rights. 91 Concerns regarding interest group
subversion of the regulatory process may not always trump these
competing values, especially when one posits even the slightest stirrings
of an altruistic spirit among regulators. 92 Because a results-oriented
measurement approach would prove useless in any context involving a
compromise among competing values (of which limiting pecuniary
rent-seeking is but one), results cannot form the basis for a
measurement approach dedicated to workably competitive pluralism.
2. A Possible Process Approach: Behavioral Focus?
Many traditional solutions to the interest group problem have taken
a behavioral approach, seeking to identify and limit particular categories
or quanta of conduct in an attempt to limit interest group influence on
the regulatory process. 93 Is it possible to identify workably competitive
pluralism by measuring behavior?
A behavioral approach is attractive for at least one reason: it would
seem to lower the risk of "false positives," a legitimate concern any
time the endgame is likely to involve placing limits upon the discretion
of regulators. After all, in the absence of actual objectionable behavior,
it might seem counterproductive to intervene in the functioning of
regulatory markets. A behavioral measurement would thus seem well-
suited to identifying only those scenarios in which interest group
subversion had actually occurred. Unfortunately, however, things are
not that simple. Like results-oriented approaches, behavioral
measurement criteria suffer from a variety of fatal flaws.
First, behavior is neither easily measured nor easily
intercomparable. Workably competitive pluralism demands both. The
goal of a workably competitive pluralism norm is to ensure a relatively
level regulatory playing field. A behavioral measurement approach
91 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984);
United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v.
Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 315 U.S. 127 (1961); U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
92 To the extent regulators are motivated at all by a commitment to the public interest, results-
oriented measurement would necessarily contain an implicit judgment that regulators' views of
the public interest were inconsistent with some quasi-natural-law public interest standard. This
approach is untenable. See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 50-51.
93 Among the most notable behavioral approaches are limits on campaign contributions and
limits on political speech.
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would necessarily infer the pitch of the playing field from the conduct
of the players. Thus a critical component of any measurement based
upon behavior is the intercomparability of various actions.
The effects of behavior upon regulators simply cannot be
measured. A single phone call to the right person at the right time may
be substantially more effective than a six-figure campaign contribution.
Given the variability of human nature, it is impossible to quantify the
effects of various activities in any meaningful sense. These difficulties
are compounded in the context of a goal of relative parity. If it is
impossible to determine the impact of any given conduct on one side of
the regulatory nexus, how much more difficult will it be to weigh one
side's conduct bundled against the other's in an attempt to infer playing
field dynamics? Measurement difficulties alone counsel against
adopting a behavioral measurement approach.
But measurement is not the only problem with behavioral metrics.
There's also the problem of human ingenuity. Any prescriptive
approach based upon a behavioral measurement would either implicitly
or explicitly limit certain categories of behavior. 94 When faced with
explicit but incomplete conduct bans, enterprising rent-seekers (or rent-
opposers) seek other conduct.
Thus, even assuming that the measurement difficulties could be
overcome, a behavioral measurement approach ultimately would either
(1) prove wholly ineffective; (2) devolve into the results-oriented
approach rejected in Part III.A. 1. above; or (3) lead to draconian (and
likely unconstitutional) restrictions on the very existence of interest
groups. Along the more benign path, behavioral measurements would
simply be useless, because their catalogue of subversive conduct would
be incomplete. As long as there exist alternative forms of influence
outside the measurement, behavioral approaches are ineffective. Those
at risk of condemnation will simply adopt strategies not covered by the
metric in question.
What if the behavioral analysis instead attempted to catalogue and
compare, ex post, each behavior at a specific regulatory nexus? Even
assuming away the substantial evidentiary problems associated with this
approach, it would still prove unworkable, because it would ultimately
produce results-oriented measurements. Given the intercomparability
problems associated with weighing the relative effects of the various
forms of rent-seeking conduct, the only effective way to rank the
94 Explicit limitations would ban certain forms of conduct because they are deemed to
interfere excessively with regulatory function. Implicit limitations would arise if the prescriptive
approach were to instead condemn regulatory results in more general terms when behavioral
thresholds are crossed. If a behaviorally based application were to invalidate regulation on the
basis of behavioral measurements, rent-seekers could avoid invalidation by avoiding conduct
condemned as effective by the metric.
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effectiveness of various conduct bundles would be by reference to the
regulatory result. If the regulatory result were unacceptable measured
against some exogenous normative baseline, then the rent-seeker's
single phone call must have been far more effective than the consumer
group's seven-figure ad campaign. Without ex ante categorization and
quantification of behaviors, any attempt to weigh regulatory market
dynamics holistically after-the-fact is likely to be infected by results-
based thinking.95
Taken to their logical extreme, behavioral approaches ultimately
lead to wholesale condemnation of interest group formation and
activity. The only principled and effective way to implement a
behaviorally driven approach is to ban all behavior that might yield a
normatively undesirable result. Yet the principles behind such a ban
hardly enjoy broad consensus support. Any "cure" based upon
wholesale restrictions on interest group formation and activity is likely
to be worse than the disease. Such restrictions would substantially limit
interest groups' constitutional petitioning rights, without inquiry into the
specific regulatory playing field dynamics that might justify such
limitation. 96
3. A Process Focus on Costs and Benefits
Instead of focusing on results or behavior, the approach to
measuring interest group dynamics must focus upon the costs and
benefits of regulation to the interests on opposite sides of the regulatory
nexus.97  Appropriately filtered, the relative benefits and costs of
regulation provide the best indication of the incentives facing parties on
both sides, and thus provide the best available information for assessing
the likely pitch of the regulatory playing field.98
Unlike results-oriented approaches, a cost/benefit measurement
95 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59.
96 And any attempt to limit interest group formation and conduct in specific contexts
ultimately devolves into a results-oriented approach.
97 This Article defines "costs" and "benefits" in net present value terms. Accordingly, the
cost/benefit calculus I propose by definition takes into account possible changes in the
distribution of costs and benefits over time. Radical intertemporal variance in costs or benefits
might weaken the predictive value of the index, but such variance is likely to be uncommon. In
the event that no intertemporal variance is expected, net present value is unnecessary to the
analysis.
98 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 33-36; see also KOMESAR, supra note 52, at 54-56, 67-71;
George J. Stigler, Free Riders and Collective Action: An Appendix to Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT SCi. 359 (1974) [hereinafter Stigler, Free Riders]. William
Eskridge proposed a less concrete version of this cost/benefit analysis when he recommended that
courts engage in less deferential statutory interpretation when the benefits of a statute are highly
concentrated and the costs are not. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance:
Implications of Public Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275 (1988).
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approach is not necessarily binary. It can instead vary as the relative
dispersion of costs and benefits varies. Accordingly, a prescriptive
application based upon a relative cost/benefit analysis could establish
any number of different intervention thresholds based upon the
importance of competing concerns. If we value petitioning rights and
federalism more highly, we could demand greater disparity in the
costs/benefits dispersion than if we think those values should be
subordinated to the integrity of the process.
Similarly, a cost/benefit approach is not enslaved to its normative
baseline in the same way other results-oriented approaches are. 99 There
are two normative baselines inherent in workably competitive
pluralism: (1) a relatively level regulatory playing field is normatively
desirable; and (2) regulatory provision of pecuniary economic rents is
undesirable. 00  But the level playing field norm dominates the
pecuniary economic rents norm, which exists primarily to help identify
the market characteristics worth measuring. The preference for a "level
playing field" is a process preference-it is not concerned with
regulatory results. Where a true results-oriented norm would
legitimately be subject to many of the criticisms Professor Elhauge
levels, 10 1 a process norm is not. For example, because of its process
focus, workably competitive pluralism (measured by reference to costs
and benefits) would permit successful pecuniary rent-seeking of the sort
economic efficiency proponents would find objectionable, provided that
it was the result of a workably competitive process.
A cost/benefit focus also subsumes within it the consensus against
pecuniary economic rent-seeking in a way results-oriented and
behavioral approaches do not. Results-oriented and behavioral
approaches stand independent of normative goals. Results-oriented
measurements, for example, could be used to condemn any category of
purportedly undesirable regulatory result-the result defines the
"excessiveness" of interest group influence. Behavioral measurements
fare even worse. First, they suffer from the same goals disconnect from
which results-oriented measurements suffer. Second, prescriptive
approaches based upon behavioral assessments may be dramatically
overinclusive. Specifically, a behavioral approach almost necessarily
would condemn conduct without reference to its aims; behavioral
measurements will therefore encourage limitations on interest group
activity that go beyond the consensus against pecuniary rent-seeking.
By contrast, a cost/benefit approach is likely only useful and
99 But see Elhauge, supra, note 2, at 51.
100 See supra notes 68-86 and accompanying text.
101 See Elhauge, supra note 2, at 49-59. To the extent Elhauge is arguing merely that
applications of interest group theory cannot be utterly devoid of normative content, granted. This
Article explicitly adopts a normative baseline.
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calculable when the regulatory nexus in question involves pecuniary
economic rents. Because it is difficult if not impossible to calculate
costs and benefits when they are non-pecuniary, a cost! benefit approach
is inherently and attractively self-limiting. Thus, the cost/benefit focus
helps ensure that prescriptive applications of IGT will not spread
beyond relatively confined consensus normative boundaries.
A cost/benefit-derived metric would also be far less subject to
gaming or workaround than behavioral metrics. Though interests can
mask or alter behavior and mask their true intentions (what piece of
rent-seeking regulation is not presented as promoting the public interest,
after all?), they cannot so easily mask the costs or benefits of the
regulation they seek. As discussed below, costs and benefits can be
determined with relative accuracy. As important, a cost/benefit focus
would limit the extent to which enterprising interests could "game" the
system by, for example, propping up a straw man whose sole purpose is
either to surrender or to offer nominal behavioral opposition.
Finally, costs and benefits can be measured and compared.
Though calculation of the costs and benefits of rent-seeking regulation
is probably well beyond the capacity of the average lawyer or judge,
such calculations are in fact the stock-in-trade of economists.
Calculation of economic rents is a staple of the public interest
watchdogs, 102 the GAO, 103 and certain academic economists. 10 4
Moreover, similar calculations are a routine feature of virtually every
significant antitrust case, where damages are typically a function of
overcharges absorbed by consumers as a result of anticompetitive
behavior.
B. Costs, Benefits, and Concentration
It is not enough, of course, merely to measure the costs and
benefits associated with regulatory action. In most cases, aggregate
costs will substantially exceed aggregate benefits, because Harberger
(allocative inefficiency/deadweight) and Tullock (administrative and
rent-seeking activity) costs will not be counterbalanced by
corresponding benefits to the rent-seeking party. 10 5 Yet rent-providing
regulation is a regular feature of the political landscape-higher
aggregate costs do not automatically imply a higher likelihood of
102 For example, Citizens Against Government Waste routinely prepares such analyses. See
generally Citzens Against Government Waste, http://www.cagw.org (last visited Dec. 17, 2007).
103 See GAO, Peanut Program, supra note 41.
104 See, e.g., Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77.
105 See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text; see also Stigler, Economic Regulation,
supra note 9, at 10.
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organization. Instead, organizational incentives are driven by the
concentration and distribution of costs and benefits among
stakeholders. 106
In simplest terms, IGT predicts that the likelihood of collective or
unilateral regulatory petitioning is primarily a function of two factors:
(1) the extent to which any individual faces economic incentives to
provide the collective good regardless of the participation of other
similarly interested parties; and/or (2) the extent to which the
concentration of costs or benefits will allow similarly situated parties to
overcome the free-rider and other collective action hurdles inherent in
any attempt to secure collective government goods. 10 7 The predicted
demand-side dynamics for regulation depend primarily upon the
concentration and distribution of benefits and costs among beneficiaries
and payors. 10 8  The pitch of the regulatory playing field-and thus
arguably the legitimacy of the regulatory result depends on the relative
likelihood of regulatory petitioning across the cost/benefit divide. Thus,
the concentration and distribution of benefits and costs offer proxies for
the likelihood that economic actors will organize for collective action or
that individual actors will seek government action on their own.
C. The Antitrust Parallel and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
Substantive antitrust law has long struggled with a virtually
identical problem: how to determine whether markets are sufficiently
concentrated to imply either (1) a likelihood of collusive
anticompetitive behavior among market participants; or (2) the
unilateral exercise of market power by a dominant firm. For the past
twenty-five years, antitrust law has embraced the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index ("HHI") as the concentration measure best able to answer those
questions in a practical and useful way. 10 9 In simplest terms, the HHI in
a given context is the sum of the square of each participant's "market
106 See OLSON, supra note 9, at 33-36; see also KOMESAR, supra note 52, at 67-71; Stigler,
Free Riders, supra note 98, at 362.
107 See Stigler, Free Riders, supra note 98, at 362.
108 This Article generally assumes a binary distribution of costs and benefits for any single
piece of legislation. This is not the same as assuming that only one interest or type of interest will
exist on either side of the costs/benefit divide; rather, it assumes that demand for a given
legislative provision is influenced only by the costs and benefits attendant with that specific
provision. Though this assumption seems reasonable in many contexts, one possible extension of
the Article would address situations in which Arrovian logrolling across multiple cost/benefit
axes ultimately produces demand for multiple legislative provisions and horse-trading among
regulators. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963)
(1951).
109 See, e.g., Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 at § III.A. (Dep't of Justice Antitrust
Div., June 30, 1982), available at 1982 WL 141384 [hereinafter 1982 Merger Guidelines].
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share" (typically expressed as a percentage) in that context., 10 In other
n
words, HHI 2 , where x,, is the market share of each firm n in the
particular market.
Albert Hirschman first introduced the index later to bear his name
in a 1945 book assessing the relationship between national power and
foreign trade from the beginning of World War I through the end of the
1930s.111 In 1950, Orris Herfindahl's doctoral dissertation
independently developed and applied a virtually identical index to
describe the deconcentration of the American steel industry over
time." 12 Calculating the HHI is a straightforward process, assuming the
existence of reliable market share data. For example, a market
consisting of ten equal-sized competitors would have an HHI of
102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102=1000. For a market
served by a single monopolist, the HHI=1002=10000. In a market of
100 equal-sized competitors, the HHI is 100.
Acceptance of HHI as an appropriate measure of market
concentration is not universal. 13 It has been criticized as "pseudo-
scientific""14 and challenged because its conclusion that the likelihood
of collusion is a function of the square of market shares is not reliably
linked to demonstrated concentration effects."l 5 These criticisms are
overblown. 116
As Herfindahl argues, the purpose of a concentration measure "is
110 See, e.g., id.
I11 HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6, at 157-60. Hirschman's formal index was defined as the square
root of the sum of squared market shares, but the principle is the same. See id at 159, 161.
112 See Orris Clemens Herfindahl, Concentration in the Steel Industry (1950) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author). Herfindahl defined the index as
the sum of the squared market shares divided by the sum of all market shares, squared, or
En
C . As before, this is the functional equivalent of the modem HHI.
113 See, e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 59 n.46 (1980); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective
and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 936,
946 (1987).
114 Fox & Sullivan, supra note 113, at 946.
115 See, e.g., SCHERER, supra note 113 at 59 n.46 (noting that "[t]here is no a priori reason
why the weighting scheme need be quadratic..."); LESLIE HANNAH & J. A. KAY,
CONCENTRATION IN MODERN INDUSTRY 41-63 (1977) (recommending variable exponent
weights); WILLIAM G. SHEPHERD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 66-67 (3d
ed. 1990) (describing HHI as "pure numbers, with no real direct real equivalent," and thus
"intrinsically an empty index.").
116 See, e.g., HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6, at 160-62, Herfindahl, supra note 112, at 15-23
(anticipating and defending measure from traditional criticisms).
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to show the likelihood of monopolistic policies in an industry.""17
Herfindahl further notes that even measures with "obscure" theoretical
foundations "may still possess heuristic value and, in turn, may provide
the theorist with valuable clues." 18 In Herfindahl's view, his measure
of concentration offered an improvement over previous measures
because it combined the two elements essential to predicting
anticompetitive outcomes: the number of firms and the dispersion of
size among those finns."19
The HHI has demonstrated its heuristic value time and again over
the past two decades. In 1982, the Justice Department formally adopted
HHI as its concentration index of choice in the then-new Horizontal
Merger Guidelines. Under the Justice Department's approach, mergers
resulting in different post-consummation industry HHIs and in different
merger-induced changes in industry HHIs are subject to different
legality presumptions. For mergers resulting in a post-merger HHI
below 1000, for example, the 1982 Merger Guidelines establish a
presumption of competitive insignificance. For mergers resulting in a
post-merger HHI above 1800, on the other hand, only small increases in
HHI are needed to create a presumption of anticompetitive effects. HHI
is now a well-established feature of the antitrust landscape. Moreover,
HHI measurements in merger enforcement law proxy for the likelihood
of both major types of anticompetitive behavior: coordinated action
among market participants and unilateral anticompetitive conduct by
large or dominant firms. 120
Despite critics' concerns, HHI captures something important to
modern competition theory: the notion that the risk of suboptimal
competitive outcomes increases as the market shares of large firms
increase and as inequality of market shares increase. 121 By squaring
117 Herfindahl, supra note 112, at 15.
118 Id. at 15-16.
119 Seeid. at20.
120 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST Div. & FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY
ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, Part 2 (March 2006), available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/215247.htm (last accessed February 27, 2007); see
also, e.g., Herfindahl, supra note 112, at 19 (describing measure as "going some distance toward
incorporating both the number of firms and the degree of domination by the large firm.").
121 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21
STAN. L. REv. 1562, 1602 (1969) ("One can complain that the Herfindahl measure is also
arbitrary. But too little is known about the precise relationship of concentration to collusion to
devise a measure of concentration that will accurately gauge the probable effect of different
concentration patterns on pricing, and the Herfindahl measure, in addition to the virtues already
mentioned, correlates well with a factor that is crucial to behavior in oligopolies: the ease of
detecting cheating."); Morris A. Adelman, Comment on the "H" Concentration Measure as a
Numbers-Equivalent, 51 REv. ECON. & STAT. 99 (1969) (suggesting that HHI is most useful in its
reciprocal fractional form, which describes the number of equal-sized firms generating the same
concentration. For example, a fractional industry HHI of 0.25 (a percentage HHI of 2500),
whatever its component parts, is equivalent to a market in which there are four equal-sized firms
(1/0.25). A fractional industry HHI of 0.05 (percentage HHI of 500) is equivalent to a market
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market shares, the HHI correctly attaches disproportionate weight to
firms with larger market shares. This approach is consonant with
common sense: consider two different markets in which the largest
eight firms account for 80% of the market. Ceteris paribus, we are
understandably more concerned about competitive conditions in a
market in which one of those four firms has a market share of 52% and
the other seven 4% apiece, than in a market in which the 80% is divided
equally among all eight firms. The HHI reflects this concern: HHI for
the former market will be far higher-in excess of 2800122-than for the
latter.' 23 However imprecise, the HHI approach provides additional
helpful information about the market, 124 information deeply relevant to
determining whether unilateral or coordinated nonmarket conduct is
likely. 125
consisting of twenty equal-sized firms. Under Adelman's numbers-equivalent approach, ceteris
paribus, a larger numbers-equivalent represents a more competitive market); Charles R. Laine,
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: A Concentration Measure Taking the Consumer's Point of
View, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 423 (1995); Stigler, Free Riders, supra note 98, at 362.
122 The 52% market share alone generates a percentage HHI of 2704, and each of the seven
4% firms contributes an additional 16 points to the calculation. Even if the remaining 20% were
spread evenly among an infinite number of atomistically small competitors, the market HHI in
that case would exceed 2816. Using Adelman's numbers-equivalent approach, a fractional
industry HHI of 0.2816 suggests concentration effects equivalent to those present in a market
consisting of 1/0.2816=3.55 equal-sized firms.
123 Assuming an atomistically small competitive fringe, the market HH1 for an industry
characterized by eight firms each with 10% of the market would approximate 800 (8*102). Even
if the competitive fringe consisted of relatively large firms (e.g., 7%, 7%, 6%), the industry HHI
would be only 934, far less than the 2800 generated by a market containing a single dominant
player. Using Adelman's numbers-equivalent approach, a fractional industry HHI of 0.0934
suggests concentration effects equivalent to those present in a market consisting of 1/0.0934=10.7
equal-sized firms.
124 Though criticisms of the HHI itself may be somewhat overblown, criticisms of specific
HHI liability or presumption thresholds are not; such thresholds are unavoidably subjective. At
this writing there exists no meaningful "test of significance" either for HHI or for the number of
total market participants at which competitive concerns materialize. See Adelman, supra note
121, at 101. The Merger Guidelines, for example, established a percentage HHI of 1000 as the
"moderately concentrated" threshold at least in part because it was a "nice round number," and
because the level was perceived by then-Assistant Attorney General and former Stanford
professor William Baxter as "a political anchorage to windward;" that is, a threshold sufficiently
low to appease those most likely to criticize Reagan Administration merger policy as too
permissive. See William F. Baxter, in AMERICAN ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1980s, at 610
(Martin Feldstein ed., 1994).
125 Hannah and Kay suggest that exponential indices of the Herfindahl type are particularly
attractive measures of concentration for certain applications, noting that an exponent value of
between 0.6 and 2.4 seems to capture "the range of interesting values." HANNAH & KAY, supra
note 115, at 58-63. The Hannah & Kay analysis supports the notion that exponential weighting
captures important information about the relationship between market concentration and market
performance in ways more traditional measurements (concentration ratios, etc.) do not.
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D. Adapting HHI to the Interest Group Context
The likelihood of interest petitioning and influence depends in
large part upon the same phenomena HHI was developed to address-
hurdles to collective action in the market context are strikingly similar
to those facing potential rent-seekers, and the unilateral power to
maximize profits parallels unilateral incentives to rent-seek. In both
situations, the same type of concentration matters. Thus, the HHI is an
attractive starting point for designing a measurement capable of
describing the organizational dynamics associated with a given
regulatory program. But the interest group calculus differs from the
antitrust calculus in one important respect: workably competitive
pluralism is concerned with relative organizational hurdles on opposite
sides of the regulatory nexus. The index this Article proposes (the
Playing Field Index or "PFI") therefore applies a substantially modified
HHI approach to measure relative interest group dynamics.126
The PFI consists of three separate calculations. First, it assesses
the concentration and distribution of benefits accruing to rent-seekers in
HHI terms by estimating, squaring, and summing the "benefit shares" of
individual beneficiaries. Second, it performs the same analysis on the
"cost" side of the ledger, generating an HHI for those from whom the
benefits in question are extracted. Finally, it compares the "benefits"
HHI to the "costs" HHI to obtain a rough assessment of the parity or
disparity of organizational challenges facing the respective sides.
Thus, there are two primary differences between standard HHI
calculations and the Playing Field Index. First, the PFI is a relative
measure, pitting benefit concentration against cost concentration in an
attempt to decipher whether and when interest group dynamics are
likely to yield one-sided regulatory demand. By contrast, traditional
HHI measures an absolute: market concentration. Also, the relevant
nominal "concern thresholds" almost certainly differ substantially
between HHI and the PFI's component parts: many industries and
interests traditional HHI would tend to define as relatively
unconcentrated and thus posing little competitive risk may still be
sufficiently concentrated to foster collective or unilateral regulatory
rent-seeking. Accordingly, though the raw numbers from which the PFI
is derived are calculated in much the same way HHIs are calculated, it is
not a nominally parallel measure. For example, an HHI of 100 is highly
unlikely to raise competitive concerns, 127 but that same nominal value
126 Using HHI in the interest group context is but a small step from its original use as a
measure of the concentration of state political power. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 6, at 158-62;
see also Stigler, Free Riders, supra note 98, at 360-62 (using traditional HIll to explain that small
groups foster collective action).
127 See, e.g., 1982 Merger Guidelines, supra note 109, at § III.A.I. (post-merger concerns not
[Vol. 29:31306
2008] ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS 1307
will often imply the likelihood of collective rent-seeking in the interest
group context. 28
In formal terms, this Article defines PFI as the loglo of the ratio
of the "benefit HHI" (BHHI) to the "cost HHI" (CHHI), or:
PFI = log0 ( BHH
I further define BHHI and CHHI immediately below. 129
1. Measuring BHHI
To calculate the BHHI, we must first identify the entities 30 that
stand to benefit from the proposed regulation, and the extent to which
each stands to benefit. Given the relative sophistication of modem
econometrics, this is feasible, even in the early stages of litigation. The
proportional distribution of benefits provides the basis for the "market
shares" used to calculate the sum-of-squares BHHI. Formally,
2
BHHI= Z(Sbx) , where Sbx is the individual benefits share of
beneficiary x expressed as a percentage.
Consider a paradigm case involving 10 identical producers seeking
uniform legislative benefits, perhaps in the form of a state-mandated
cartel that will result in substantial output restrictions and concomitant
price increases.13' In that case, each producer would enjoy a 10%
"market share" in the putative benefits. Summing the squares of those
market shares yields a BHHI of 1000.132 The HHI-derived approach in
this case accesses both "market share" effects and the "number of
raised unless postmerger HHI exceeds 1000).
128 This is due primarily to differences in the nature of the benefits of traditional collusion and
the pursuit of collective good.
129 Readers are also encouraged to visit and use the associated PFI calculator available at
http://www.law.uiuc.edu/stancil/index.asp.
130 One additional strength of the HHI approach lies in the relative irrelevance of small market
shares (here, benefit or cost shares) in otherwise concentrated markets. Because the HHI sums
the squares of market shares, small shares add disproportionately little to the calculation when
dominated by larger shares. Thus it is not always necessary to identify all of the beneficiaries or
payors, so long as we are comfortable that the unknown fringe is relatively small compared to the
known body of stakeholders. For example, in a 51 -firm market consisting of one 50% entity and
fifty 1% entities, the HHI calculation is utterly dominated by the single large firm; of the total
industry HHI of 2550, fully 2500 points derives from the dominant firm's market share. If the
remaining 50% of the market were instead shared equally by 200 tiny firms, the resulting HHI
would be 2512-an immaterial change from the 51-firm HHI. See Adelman, supra note 121, at
100.
131 To the extent assigning a dollar value to these benefits helps concretize the hypothetical,
assume $1 million apiece in benefits, although the absolute figure is ultimately irrelevant.
132 BHHI=IO2 +102+101+10 2+102+102+10+10 2+102+10-l000.
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participants" effects, each of which are critically important in assessing
whether collective action problems can be overcome.
Changing the paradigm case to a "dominant firm/competitive
fringe" variant (e.g., one firm receiving 50% of the benefits, with the
remaining 50% spread equally over 9 firms) generates a BHHI of
approximately 2777.133 This increase comports with intuition and with
economic theory predicting an increased likelihood of rent-seeking
behavior. If a single firm will benefit to that extent, it is likely to seek
the rent on its own. On the flip side, a 1000-producer market with equal
benefit distribution would yield a BHHI of 10. Experience teaches that
interest groups of 100, 1000, or even more members can often
overcome their collective action hurdles to form effective rent-seeking
organizations,134 but all other things being equal, it is obviously more
difficult for 1000 producers to organize than for 10.135
2. Measuring CHHI
The CHHI is the mirror image of the BHHI from the cost side.
2
Formally, CHHI = "(S0 ), where Sy is the individual cost share of
each payor y expressed as a percentage. If the paradigm benefits group
introduced above makes the mistake of seeking an economic rent from
an equal but opposite group (ten payors each paying an equal share of
the benefits), the CHHI would also be 1000.136 In many cases, however,
the CHHI is likely to be below 1 or even close to 0. As Simon
Newcomb observed, it makes sense for rent-seekers to extract their
desired rents as broadly as possible among payors. 137 Consider, for
example, a regulatory program whose rents will be paid in equal
proportion by the entire American population-300,000,000 individual
citizens. 138 The CHHI associated with this program would be very
small indeed. 139
Importantly, this Article deliberately treats legislative rent seeking
133 BHHI=502+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9) 2+(50/9)
2=2777.
134 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
135 See, e.g., OLSON, supra note 9, at 132-65.
Y 2
136 CHHI = Z(s ) 102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102+102= 1000.
137 See NEWCOMB, supra note 7, at 457.
138 Using the dollar figures from the paradigm example discussed above, a $10 million benefit
paid pro rata by each American citizen would result in per-citizen payments of approximately
$0.33.
139 CHHI=y (1/(3"108)*100) 2 = 1.1 1 * l0'3=(3*108)* (1.11 * 10-3) = 0.000033.
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as akin to a zero-sum game in which absolute differences between costs
and benefits are effectively irrelevant. This simplification is admittedly
technically incorrect in a rather important way: legislative rent-seeking
tends in fact to be a negative-sum game resulting in social welfare
losses arising out of (1) decreased output of desirable goods or services;
(2) inefficient allocation of resources toward the procurement of
economic rents rather than productive activity; and (3) socially wasteful
expenditures associated with the administration of rent-providing
regulation. 140  Nonetheless, with one important exception, it is
appropriate to exclude these additional losses from the calculations for
two reasons, one theoretical and one pragmatic.
At a pragmatic level, deadweight costs are both difficult to
calculate and difficult to assign. Compared to "overcharge" costs-
costs obtained by estimating the aggregate out-of-pocket expenses of
payors resulting from a given regulation, deadweight costs may be more
complicated to locate and estimate. Similarly, it would be substantially
more difficult to assign these costs to payors for the purposes of CHHI
calculation, since they tend to be costs associated with foregone
consumption.
From a theoretical perspective, deadweight or non-overcharge
costs should only be included in the CHHI measure to the extent they
represent a legitimate bloc of economic power for which it is rational to
assess the likelihood of collective action. Those bearing the cost of
foregone consumption, as opposed to merely higher-priced
consumption, are substantially less likely than "overcharge consumers"
to be aware of and internalize those costs. As a result, deadweight costs
do not proxy for collective action probability in the same way
overcharge costs do. Similarly, a significant portion of the deadweight
loss associated with legislative rent seeking lies in the resources
expended to obtain and administer economic rents. In concrete terms,
campaign contributions, lobbying costs, media expenses, administrative
costs and the other traditional accoutrements of regulatory rent-seeking
are by definition a net social loss. 14' And these inefficient expenditures
simply cannot be assigned to a payor with any incentive to vindicate the
public interest. For stakeholders in the rent-seeking enterprise, for
example, such costs are by definition worthwhile if they yield a single
dollar in economic rent. And the politicians, lawyers, restaurants,
advertising agencies, television stations and bureaucrats benefiting from
these expenditures are hardly likely to complain. Thus, while those
costs are a very real part of the equation, they are not borne directly by
any constituency for whom that burden is likely to stimulate collective
opposition. Accordingly, deadweight costs are excluded from the
140 See, e.g., supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
141 See Tullock, supra note 9, at 225-26, 228.
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calculation of CHHI.
a. Of Pass-Through and Pivots
In many or even most cases, calculation of CHHI will be relatively
straightforward. Payors will be easy to identify, and calculation
methodology, while contestable and subject to competing assumptions,
will generally be simple. But there are two potentially complicating
(and interacting) factors, each of which may warrant further research:
(1) the potential for pass-through and (2) the problem of "pivots." Both
of these issues arise in multi-level payor structures, where there are
multiple levels of distribution between producers and consumers.
i. The Potential for Pass-Through
CHHI measurements are accurate only to the extent they capture
the likelihood of actual opposition to rent-seeking regulation. This is in
turn determined by the extent to which payors actually feel the sting of
that regulation. If upstream payors are able to pass through the costs
they bear to downstream consumers, a CHHI calculation based upon
those upstream producers' costs may overstate the upstream payors'
incentives to oppose that regulation. What, if anything, should be done
about multiple layers of payors?
At first blush, it might appear that the CHHI calculation must take
pass-through into account for any structure involving intermediate
payors. Consider, for example, peanut subsidies, one of the clearer
examples of economic rent provision in contemporary experience. 42
The beneficiaries of peanut subsidies (which take the form of explicit
production limits) are obvious: 143 holders of peanut farming permits. 144
On the payor side, however, there are several classes of potential
victims. First, there are direct peanut purchasers, who roast peanuts for
individual consumption or incorporate peanuts into their products.
Second, there are wholesalers and retailers of peanut-containing
products. Finally, there are end-users of those products. The extent to
which the intermediate levels of payor-manufacturers using peanuts,
wholesalers, retailers, etc.-are likely to organize in opposition to
142 See, e.g., GAO, Peanut Program, supra note 41.
143 The existence and composition of other potential classes of beneficiaries (e.g., producers of
substitute goods whose profits increase when peanut prices are high) are too speculative to
include in the calculation, essentially for the same reasons the CHH1 calculation excludes
consideration of Harberger and Tullock costs.
144 Many permit holders do not farm themselves, but rather sell their rights on the open
market. See GAO, Peanut Program, supra note 41, at 4.
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regulatory rent-seeking is not dictated solely by the overcharges those
payors incur. Instead, their collective action calculus would appear to
be driven by the economic costs associated with those overcharges. In
most cases, this would translate to the profits lost by virtue of the
inflated prices they pay for peanuts. By contrast, end consumers' costs
are effectively "overcharge costs."
Accordingly, further research might analyze whether the PFI
should assess upstream costs on a "lost profits" basis and final
downstream costs on an "overcharge" basis. In other words, it is
possible that upstream payors (e.g., peanut butter manufacturers, etc.)
should be subject to a CHHI cost share calculation based upon the
profits they lose by virtue of government rent-provision to peanut
farmers. Assuming demand for peanut butter is not perfectly inelastic,
the economic rents provided to peanut growers will have the effect of
shifting the supply curve to a less profitable point for peanut processors;
their actual incentive to oppose rent-seeking behavior may not be
directly proportional to the quantum of the "but for" overcharges they
pay, but rather to the lost profits they suffer because they pay too much.
Ultimate downstream payors (consumers of peanut butter,
perhaps), by contrast, would face economic incentives to oppose
regulation primarily in proportion to the overcharges they pay.
Accordingly, a rent-seeking beneficiary is likely to face the least
opposition from a multilevel payor structure when the top level (in
which economic rents are likely to be relatively concentrated) can pass
through all or most of those rents to more diffuse downstream
purchasers without suffering significant lost profits. This occurs when
demand for the downstream product(s) is relatively inelastic.
It admittedly would be more difficult and more expensive to
calculate CHHI using incidence analysis. But it is hardly impossible.
Economists routinely perform similar calculations in so-called "indirect
purchaser" antitrust lawsuits, apportioning economic damages among
direct and indirect purchasers of price-fixed goods. 145  Under the
reasonable assumption that lost profits and overcharges are generally
ascertainable, calculation of the CHHI remains relatively
straightforward.
For example, consider an industry in which the six direct
purchasers of a product each would suffer $50,000 in lost profits in
connection with a proposed regulation. In addition, the general
population (approximately 300 million people) would suffer a per-
capita loss of $1 apiece. In such a situation, the CHHI would be
approximately 0.0017.146 By contrast, consider an industry in which the
145 See, e.g., George Kosicki & Miles B. Cahill, Economics of Cost Pass Through and
Damages in Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST BULL. 599 (2006).
146 These calculations can be replicated on the website associated with this Article. See supra
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six direct purchasers of a product would each suffer $2 million in lost
profits, passing on only a $0.25 per-capita overcharge to the general
population. In that case, the CHHI would be 31.70.147
The single most obvious implication of the pass-through problem
is that demand elasticity is an important predictor of collective
opposition in most multi-level payor structures. The less elastic the
demand for a particular product or service, the more likely it is that
intermediate levels will be able to pass through overcharges without
sacrificing profits. Thus, while one could take an Illinois Brick 48
approach to the PFI process, basing PFI calculations solely upon the
nominal concentration dynamics at the initial cost-benefit interface, this
would be enormously problematic in any relatively inelastic context.
Inelastic demand implies the ability to pass through overcharges to
lower levels of distribution without sacrificing significant profits, so
nominally concentrated top-level payors frequently will have little or no
incentive to organize in opposition to rent-seeking producers.
ii. The Pivot Problem
Despite the potential for pass-through, this Article tentatively
recommends ignoring multiple distribution levels until further research
suggests otherwise. Instead, the CHHI should be measured at the
lowest possible level of payor, typically individual consumers of the
goods or services subject to rent-seeking. Why? Because intermediate
payors may also act as economic "pivots," deliberately aligning with
either producers or end-consumers to promote their own economic self-
interest. If, for example, intermediaries were to align with producers,
they might insist that the producers buy them off, exchanging some
portion of the economic rent for their silence or support before
regulators. Judge Frank Easterbrook hypothesizes just such a state of
affairs in the case of milk handlers, direct purchases who traditionally
remain silent in the face of producers' demands for rent-providing price
supports. 149 Intermediate purchaser extortion is conceptually similar to
note 129.
147 See id.
148 See Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). The much-criticized Illinois Brick
rule rejects federal antitrust suits by indirect purchases. Instead, it allows only direct purchasers
to sue for the full amount of overcharges, even if they have been able to pass through the
overcharges to downstream customers. The Illinois Brick rule has been rejected by a majority of
states, and a bipartisan blue-ribbon Commission has tentatively recommended that it be
statutorily overruled. See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, TENTATIVE
RECOMMENDATIONS 16, available at
http://www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/list-of recommendationsjan 1 lv3.pdf.
149 See Frank Easterbrook, The Supreme Court-1983 Term-Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 48-50 (1984). Though Easterbrook seems to ascribe milk
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the regulatory extortion modeled by McChesney.150
When pivot intermediaries align themselves with producers, the
total rent would be split among various upstream interests, producers
included. But its overall impact upon consumers remains the same.
Thus, whenever a rent-seeker anticipates opposition from high-level
purchasers, it is in the rent-seeker's interest to buy them off. Of course,
intermediaries capable of organization ostensibly have a choice. Instead
of sharing rents with the rent-seekers, they could theoretically align
themselves with downstream payors (usually consumers). But in
reality, the same organizational dynamics that can operate to deny
consumers' meaningful participation in the regulatory process will
likely limit the extent to which intermediate purchasers can align with
consumers: compared to the well-organized producers, there will be no
one for pivots to talk to on the consumer side. Accordingly, this Article
recommends calculation of CHHI at the lowest level of payor for the
time being. Nonetheless, the potential for pass-through and the pivot
problem are worthy of further study, and a more evolved PFI analysis
might account for those phenomena in some way.
3. The Playing Field Index
Boiled down to its mathematical essentials, the raw index this
Article proposes is simply the ratio of BHHI to CHHI. Thus, in a
perfectly matched demand scenario, where BHHI=CHHI, the raw index
would be one. As the concentration of benefits rises relative to the
concentration of costs, the ratio approaches infinity. For example, if a
monopolist/sole beneficiary (BHHI=10000) seeks rents to be extracted
equally from each taxpayer (CHHI=0.0000333), the raw index would be
approximately 300,000,000. By contrast, when concentration of costs
exceeds the concentration of benefits (thus suggesting that interest
group activity is unlikely to produce the desired regulation), the raw
index drops below one; as the CHHI further increases relative to the
BHHI, the raw index approaches zero.
For a variety of reasons, the straight ratio approach is inferior to a
logarithmic approach. Thus, this Article defines PFI as the base-10
logarithm of the ratio between BHHI and CHHI, or
PFI = lg BHHI
-oyCHHI
Logarithmic transformation gives the index the "proper" intuitive
handlers' entire silence to rent-splitting, the relatively inelastic demand for milk suggests that
pass-through might also contribute.
150 See McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79-82.
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sign. A PFI of zero, for example, represents a playing field in perfect
demand equipoise-the collective action infrastructure on one side of
the equation sees its mirror image across the divide, and workably
competitive pluralism is predicted. By extension, any positive PFI
would indicate a playing field favoring beneficiaries, and any negative
PFI a playing field favoring payors. 151 In addition, the logarithm
approach imbues the index with a helpful symmetry-a logarithmic PFI
of 2 represents a playing field favoring beneficiaries to exactly the same
extent that a logarithmic PFI of -2 represents a playing field favorable to
payors. 152 By contrast, a straight ratio approach would assign the
facially different values of 100 and 0.01 to each of these mirror image
PFIs,. respectively.
Finally, though it is admittedly a minor point, the logarithm
approach keeps the index "reasonable": a raw index of 1,000,000
translates to a logl0 PFI of 6, and a'straight ratio index of 0.000001 to a
loglo PFI of -6.153 Logarithmic transformation is not mathematically
necessary to make the index useful, but it is nonetheless attractive. 15 4
E. A Milk-Based Hypothetical
A detailed sample PFI calculation, based upon a historical real-
world example, helps illustrate both the mechanics and the utility of a
PFI approach more completely. In much of the country, the production
151 Compare this to the straight ratio approach, in which equipoise is represented by a value of
1, beneficiary tilt by any value above 1, and payor tilt by any value between 0 and 1.
152 As should be obvious, the terms "payors" and "beneficiaries" are under certain
circumstances interchangeable or are determined by the interests' initial positions. See
McChesney, Interest-Group Organization, supra note 22, at 79-82.
153 Given a U.S. population of 300 million, the straight ratio PFI has a practical maximum
value of approximately 300 million. See supra note 129. The logl0 PFI for that same scenario is
approximately 8.5.
154 The ratio approach has at least one apparent weakness: an index derived solely by dividing
BHHI by CHHI fails to take into account the absolute benefit and cost levels associated with
regulation. As such, the ratio approach may be criticized because it will fail to identify situations
in which the absolute benefit levels are too low to encourage rent seeking (i.e., when the cost of
seeking the rent exceeds the expected value of the rent) or when the absolute cost levels are
sufficiently high to encourage opposition without collective action. However, these problems are
more apparent than real. As to the latter scenario, the index is still useful to the extent it identifies
massive disproportionality in rent seeking incentives. At some PFI level, the fact that unilateral
opposition may be likely as an absolute matter cannot overwhelm the disparity in interests and the
likely implications that disparity has as to the resources the parties will bring to bear to
accomplish their legislative ends. As to the former scenario, while it is true that a large PFI could
generate a "false positive" because the benefit level is too low to encourage rent-seeking in the
first place, these scenarios are likely of very limited practical significance. It may well be
worthwhile to append an absolute costs/absolute benefits "reality check" to academic applications
of the PFI, but the market likely will self-correct for this flaw in any real-world (e.g., judicial or
legislative) application.
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of fluid milk is subject to heavy price regulation by the federal
government. 55 And like most price regulation programs, the federal
milk marketing order system has historically provided substantial
economic rents to producers-in this case, dairies. 56 According to an
empirical study performed by Richard Ippolito and Robert Masson
based on 1973 data, the social costs of these milk marketing orders are
substantial: the authors there estimated gross rent transfers to regulated
farmers of approximately $210 million annually. 57 This figure did not
include the approximately $60 million in annual social costs associated
with the programs. 158
Others can debate the validity of the Ippolito/Masson
conclusions. 59 Regardless of its accuracy, it both demonstrates that
economists can in fact perform the primary calculations necessary to the
calculation of a PFI and permits rough calculation of a back-of-the-
napkin PFI in the federal milk marketing order context. In addition,
publicly available data regarding the dairy business provides some
ability to examine possible permutations and combinations beyond a
simple arithmetic PFI calculation. 60
According to Ippolito and Masson, there were approximately
300,000 dairy farmers in the mid-1970s.16 1 Though this number was far
too large to support any traditional theory of private collusion, it is well-
documented that dairies had successfully lobbied regulators for nearly a
century by the time the article was published. 162 The federal milk
regulations in question were themselves almost 40 years old during the
sample analysis period. 163 By contrast, the U.S. population in 1973 was
approximately 210 million.
Using certain simplifying assumptions, it is possible to calculate a
PFI from this data alone. For example, assume that all dairies were of
the same size and thus stood to benefit equally from any regulatory rent
155 See, e.g., http://www.ams.usda.gov/dairy/orders.htm.
156 See, e.g., Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77.
157 See id at 53-55.
158 See generally id. and at 59-60. The authors of the study categorized social costs separately
from transfers, which are at least arguably efficiency-neutral. The social costs they calculated
included: (1) Harberger or deadweight losses, id. at 51-55; see also supra notes 74-76 and
accompanying text; (2) inefficient transport costs resulting from distorted shipment incentives,
Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77, at 56-59; and (3) Tullock or administrative costs (including
both the costs of seeking economic rents, and costs of administering those rent-providing
programs), id. at 59-60.
159 In fact, any application of the PFI in practice is likely to be subject to substantial
methodological debate.
160 The point of this exercise is not to provide an accurate calculation of a PFI, but is rather to
sketch the outlines of the process and offer thoughts on some of the complexities that might be
encountered in a real-world application.
161 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77, at 33.
162 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 21, at 88.
163 Ippolito & Masson, supra note 77, at 36-38.
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program. 164 Further assume that the transfer burden of this rent fell
equally on each resident of the United States and that cognizable costs
and benefits are the same ($210 million annually). 165 Using these
assumptions, each dairy stands to benefit to the tune of approximately
$700 annually from regulation. By contrast, each resident would pay
approximately $1 in extra milk costs annually. Using these figures and
assumptions, the PFI calculation yields a BHHI of 0.03, and a CHHI of
0.00004672. Thus, the ratio of BHHI to CHHI is 700, and the PFI is
2.85.166
But what if the appropriate cost-side economic unit is not
"residents" but is instead "households?" This would seem to comport
more with reality, since households tend to function as the primary
consuming economic unit in American society. Leaving all other
figures constant but changing the "number of payors" to 68 million (a
rough approximation of the number of U.S. households in 1973) yields
per-household costs of $3.10 and a PFI of 2.36.
Of course, this would not be the only possible change in approach.
More sophisticated analysis might account for differences in size among
dairies. The variations inherent in a sample size of 300,000 take such
analysis beyond the scope of this Article, but it is possible to generate a
stylized version by assuming a generally uniform benefit-side market
structure with a few idiosyncratically large beneficiaries. For example,
assume all dairies are of identical size except for six large "mega-
dairies," each of which stands to enjoy a $1 million annual benefit from
regulation. Assuming a household-based payor structure, the PFI in this
context rises from 2.36 to 3.97. This massive increase (equivalent to an
increase of well over ten times the concentration disparity compared to
the uniform benefits case), is nonetheless reasonable; if six dairies stand
to benefit to that extent individually, they would face substantial
incentives to organize and seek rents even without the participation of
the much smaller fringe dairies. 67
CONCLUSION
The PFI approach this Article suggests is at once modest and
ambitious. On the "modest" end of the spectrum, it offers no sweeping,
164 This is a conservative assumption. Any disparity in size among dairies will necessarily
increase the BHHI.
165 For purposes of this Article, it would unnecessarily complicate matters to calculate PFIs in
net present value terms; however, more sophisticated analyses might take this step as well.
166 All of these calculations can be verified on the website associated with this Article. See
supra note 129.
167 The presence of even a single million-dollar "mega-dairy" would increase PFI
substantially, from 2.36 to 3.24.
[Vol. 29:31316
ASSESSING INTEREST GROUPS
universal solution to the interest group problem, in part because no such
solution exists. Neither does it attempt to reconcile the disparate strains
of regulatory theory or indeed to persuade anyone that any particular
theory is correct. Instead, built on a normative framework that should
enjoy substantial cross-ideological consensus, the PFI provides an
objective mechanism for identifying the low-hanging fruit'68-
pecuniary economic rent-providing government regulation obtained on
a decidedly tilted regulatory playing field-without endorsing any
universal normative standard under which to judge all alleged instances
of regulatory capture. Thus, though the PFI can help identify scenarios
in which workably competitive pluralism is unlikely, it does not
measure (and a PFI-driven prescriptive approach thus would not
condemn) rent-providing regulation obtained on a workably level
legislative playing field.
Nor does a particular PFI measurement guarantee the presence or
absence of "undue" interest group influence. Indeed, to the extent the
PFI is prescriptively useful, it is only as a barometer of conditions,
rather than as proof of process corruption. At its very best, prophylactic
use of the PFI may still yield false positives.
As important, absent future empirical testing of its predictive
value, the PFI is at most an adjunct to other existing economic theories
of regulatory function. For example, Becker's "interest group
competition" model predicts efficient regulatory equilibria by way of
dynamic interaction between competing interest groups and
regulators.169 Other scholars suggest that opportunities for exit-voting
with one's feet-may be sufficient to protect regulatory systems from
capture. 170  To the extent the PFI is useful, its value may lie in
identifying organizational disparities so substantial that neither dynamic
interest group competition nor exit are likely to solve the problem;
further work should focus on identifying such "breaking points."
At the same time, the PFI approach is also ambitious. Any
meaningful prescriptive application of the PFI would dramatically
reshape the interface between regulators and the regulated. Prescriptive
limits based on the PFI are superior to other possible approaches, but
they would inevitably limit petitioning activity and would likely involve
some level of judicial intrusion into the legislative and executive
domains. 1 7'
168 And it is often fruit-agricultural subsidies are among the most obvious examples of
pecuniary economic rent provision in the American system.
169 See Becker, supra note 9, at 376-81.
170 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Antitrust and the Economics of Federalism, 26 J.L. & ECON.
23, 33-40 (1983); Larry E. Ribstein and Bruce H. Kobayashi, The Economics of Federalism, (U
Illinois Law & Economics Research Paper No. LE06-001), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=875626.
171 But see Chevron, supra note 91.
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Where do we go from here? There are several possible
applications of the PFI, from purely academic investigations of its
utility to full-scale use of the PFI to arrest or reverse some of the
excesses of the interest group state. Among other possible prescriptive
applications, two stand out: (1) Lochner-style invalidation of regulation
that fails to pass an appropriate PFI screen; 172 or (2) limiting of antitrust
immunity under the Parker,173 Noerr-Pennington,174 and NASD 175
doctrines when the regulation in question fails a similar screen. Revival
of Lochner could actually be justified on quasi-procedural rather than
substantive due process grounds-any sufficiently high PFI could be
interpreted as prima facie evidence that those bearing the costs of
regulation did not have a meaningful opportunity to defend their
property before regulators. That said, Lochner is perhaps better off
dead after all, and it is difficult in any event to envision a court seizing
on the PFI approach to overturn seventy-five years of judicial deference
to economic regulation. By contrast, locating an application of PFI
within antitrust law seems somewhat more promising, since it would
operate only to strip private parties of immunity from antitrust suit
(rather than to invalidate regulation wholesale) and then only when the
democratic process appears to have been compromised.
Regardless of its ultimate prescriptive application, the PFI solves
two of the problems that have essentially frozen interest group theory
for almost a generation. It provides a broad-based normative
framework that can help evaluate the interaction of interest group theory
and the regulatory process. And building on that framework, it offers a
useful real-world mechanism for measuring organizational dynamics
that can dramatically affect regulatory outcomes.
172 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
173 See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
174 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 315 U.S. 127 (1961);
United Mine Workers v. Pennngton, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
175 See United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
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